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Abstract 
In the U.S. Navy, the DDG 51 (Arleigh Burke) class of guided-missile 
destroyer, which first entered service in 1991, remains in production with over 70 
vessels delivered. This report explores some of the key reasons for the success of 
this ship. The upcoming Flight III of the class, which begins procurement in fiscal 
year 2016, faces the challenging integration of the Air and Missile Defense Radar, 
which adds ballistic missile defense capability to the vessel. We conclude that the 
DDG 51 class features the expandability (growth margin) and open systems 
characteristic of a “persistent platform” that continues in production and service for a 
greater period of time than would have originally been contemplated. 
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Executive Summary 
The idea behind this research originated with the Acquisition Research 
Program list of potential sponsored research topics for fiscal year (FY) 2015, which 
asked, “How do we acquire systems with performance margins and configuration 
flexibility to support 30 or 40 years of unknown threats?” One of the best examples 
of what could be called “persistent platforms” that have encountered success is the 
DDG 51 Arleigh Burke destroyer, a class that entered service in 1991. The DDG 51 
is a multi-mission, guided-missile ship with an emphasis on air defense. The 
success of this class, which now includes more than 70 vessels (including the first 
Flight III vessel that will be procured beginning in FY2016), has been attributed to 
the ship’s “growth margin,” which is the capacity for successfully receiving new or 
additional equipment that is larger, heavier, or more power-intensive than in the 
original configuration. 
The incorporation of evolving technologies into the DDG 51, culminating in a 
successful critical design review of Flight III’s Air and Missile Defense Radar in April 
2015, makes it reasonable to characterize the DDG 51 as a persistent platform. 
Another contributing factor is the incorporation of major systems from the DDG 1000 
and LHD 6/7 vessels into Flight III, reducing acquisition risk and lowering costs. On 
balance, the DDG 51 represents a good example of an open system as 
contemplated in Department of Defense (DOD) guidance: Minimized duplication for 
technology development investments, and shared life-cycle costs among several 
major shipbuilding programs. 
Critics have pointed out that Flight III lacks an Analysis of Alternatives and is 
proceeding on the basis of an Engineering Change Proposal rather than a new 
requirements and contracting process. Yet the Navy’s strategy does allow for the 
benefits of multi-year procurement, and with production of ships split evenly between 
two yards using the Profit Related to Offers concept, there is stability accompanied 
by reasonable incentives in the industrial base—something observers of the 
shipbuilding industry have often expressed a desire for. With the cancellation of the 
CG(X) and truncation of the DDG 1000–class at three ships, the Navy will be relying 
on the DDG 51s for years to come to meet a wide variety of maritime requirements. 
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Introduction 
The idea behind this paper originated with the Acquisition Research Program 






How do we acquire systems with performance margins and 
configuration flexibility appropriate to support 30 or 40 years of 
unknown threats? What engineering standards and design protocols 
must be changed to accommodate non-point solution design 
solutions? In short how do we NOT end up with another AAAV/EFV, 
F-22, B-2, or other really cool, really expensive, but broadly useless 
system? How did we get the B-52, the LPD 4 class and the CVN 68 
class, all VERY useful and almost timeless systems that have served 
as first line platforms for their entire service lives and, actually 
beyond? 
The above statement makes a legitimate point. While programs can be 
troubled and subject to endless delays (like the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting 
Vehicle) or built in much smaller quantities that anticipated (e.g., F-22, B-2), these 
“boutique” systems can’t be fairly characterized as “broadly useless.” The systems 
portrayed as successful in the above statement share a number of qualities, 
including long service lives, multiple changes in mission, the ability to integrate new 
technologies into the prime platform, and a sufficient number of end items to 
generate economies of scale. The “failures,” like the F-22, often procured in smaller 
quantities than intended, do successfully perform the relatively narrow missions they 
were designed for. 
One of the best examples of what could be called “persistent platforms” that 
have encountered success is the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke guided-missile destroyer, a 
class that entered service in 1991. The destroyer’s production run “has outlasted 
every other battleship, cruiser, destroyer and frigate in U.S. Navy history” (Sharp, 
2009). The DDG 51 is a multi-mission destroyer with an emphasis on air defense. 
The success of the Arleigh Burke class, which now includes more than 70 vessels, 
has been attributed to the ship’s “growth margin,” which is the capacity for 
successfully receiving new or additional equipment that is larger, heavier, or more 
power-intensive than in the original configuration (O’Rourke, 2015a). For example, 
some future vessels will feature a hybrid electric drive (Scott, 2015). Additionally, 
modular vertical launch systems featuring the Standard Missile Three have been 
installed on DDG 51s (Doerry, 2012). The relatively high volume of vessels and the 
allocation of ships to two builders while maintaining competition (as discussed 
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below) are also indicators of successful shipbuilding practices (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2009). 
This paper uses the “snowball” technique of data gathering. Starting with 
visits to the websites of DOD organizations, manufacturers, think tanks and 
Congress, as well as the commercial databases available through the Naval 
Postgraduate School library, information is collected until redundancy begins to 
occur, at which point data collection ends and the analysis phase begins (Biernacki 
and Waldorf, 1981). 
This paper begins by reviewing the background of the DDG 51 class of 
vessels. Second, we discuss the development of the upcoming Flight III of the 
vessels. The next section covers the integration challenges associated with the new 
Air and Missile Defense Radar aboard that series of ships. We conclude by 
discussing the characteristics of the DDG 51 as a persistent platform. 
The Open Systems Approach 
While the concept of “growth margin” is very useful for the physical capacity 
for renewal of a prime system, the “open systems” or “modular open systems” 
concepts promote an incremental or evolutionary view of the acquisition process, 
with each increment providing an increased level of capability. Open systems 
architecture enables design for affordable change, employs evolutionary acquisition 
and spiral development, and uses an integrated roadmap for system design and 
development (DOD, 2014; GAO, 2014c). Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 
5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (OUSD[AT&L], 2015, 
January 7), requires the program manager to apply “open system approaches in 
product designs where feasible and cost effective” (enclosure 3, sec. 14). 
Open system approaches form part of an overall Intellectual Property (IP) 
strategy according to DODI 5000.02, Enclosure 2, Section 7b. Program needs for IP 
deliverables and associated license rights are considered necessary for “competitive 
and affordable acquisition and sustainment over the entire life cycle” (OUSD[AT&L], 
2015, January 7, enclosure 2, sec. 7b). Beyond the requirements internal to the 
DOD, contracts should also be structured to encourage vendors to provide open 
systems, and contractors must describe how they will meet modular open system 
requirements (Rendon, 2006; DOD, 2013, p. 5). 
The following business practices are recommended by the DOD (2013) to 
support open systems programs: 
• Seek data deliverables and rights in technical data and computer 
software sufficient for competition throughout the life cycle as an 
objective; 
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• Continuous competition throughout the life cycle; 
• Increased capability to the warfighter on a faster development timeline; 
• Reduced life cycle costs; 
• Shared risks with other programs; 
• Minimized duplication for technology development investments, shared 
life cycle costs; and 
• Collaboration through peer reviews. (p. ix) 
In addition to the above, an “open business model” is recommended, as such 
an approach “requires doing business transparently to leverage the collaborative 
innovation of numerous participants across the enterprise permitting shared risk, 
maximize asset reuse and reduce total ownership costs“ (DOD, 2013, p. 139). 
Reuse of assets allows unique development efforts to serve several purposes, 
including uses that were unknown or unintended at the time of fielding of the original 
system. Open systems architecture is therefore a means for stimulating innovation. 
A shift toward persistent platforms like the DDG 51 needs to be carried out in 
parallel to a move toward open systems. As stated recently in an Air Force policy 
document,  
To the extent that our current policies and regulations can be modified 
to change the paradigm from large, complex programs rife with 
crippling interdependencies to programs with simple, severable 
components, open architectures, and more distributed participation, we 
will enact those changes. (Department of the Air Force [DAF], 2014)  
However, requirements discipline remains critical. As the GAO has found, 
shipbuilding should include (1) demonstrating balance among program 
requirements, technology demands, and cost considerations by preliminary design 
review, and (2) retiring technical risk and closing any remaining gaps in design 
requirements before a contract for detail design is awarded (GAO, 2009). 
For reuse to be possible, “strategic use of data rights” is needed to moderate 
the monopolistic power of the vendor throughout the life cycle, which can result in 
“vendor lock” (DOD, 2013, pp. vii–ix, pp. 167–176). Vendor lock gives the vendor 
what can become monopolistic powers, freeing the vendor to establish 
noncompetitive prices and become a sole source for a product or service. The DOD 
has “little leverage to control costs and manage performance in a vendor lock 
scenario” (GAO, 2014b; GAO, 2014c). As further explained by the GAO: 
The most difficult challenge is overcoming a general cultural 
preference within the services for acquiring proprietary systems that 
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puts life-cycle decisions in the hands of the contractors that developed 
and produced those systems. Those contractors, therefore, benefit 
from maintaining the status quo with respect to long-term weapon 
system sustainment. (GAO, 2014c) 
However, the effects of vendor lock can be mitigated through, among other 
practices, exploring common product lines for commonality and shared technology, 
rather than developing new products that correspond to individual program 
requirements (Wydler, 2014). Such an approach should result in modular systems 
and subsystems that can be openly competed. 
An example of the use of an open architecture approach is the Navy’s 
procurement of the Ground Control Segment (GCS) for its Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs). The GCS is a common baseline for all Navy UAV programs, with 
users selecting mission applications from an “app store.” Within the GCS 
environment, all interfaces are known to all vendors, allowing a modular approach 
that promotes competition. A working group with representatives of more than 200 
organizations defined both the interfaces and systems architecture (Lundquist, 
2013). 
The emphasis on reducing life-cycle costs is particularly notable. Successful, 
long-lived systems may have lived through the “death spiral” of decreasing quantities 
and increasing unit cost during their initial development and production. However, at 
later stages, such as following Full Operational Capability, ongoing modifications to 
persistent platforms may be significantly less expensive than the development of 
new products. The Navy’s approach to the DDG 51 class has been described as 
follows: 
Prior to Flight III, the program has produced three flights (I, II and IIA). 
Flights II and IIA included important modifications for changing mission 
requirements and technology updates, thus demonstrating the 
substantial capacity and flexibility of the base DDG 51 hull form. Flight 
II introduced enhanced capability in Combat Systems and Electronic 
Warfare. Flight IIA constituted a more significant change to the ship by 
incorporation of an organic dual hangar/dual helicopter aviation facility, 
extended transom, zonal electrical power distribution, enhanced 
missile capacity, and reconfigured primary radar arrays. The combined 
scope and means for integrating the changes for Flight III is similar to 
the approach used in the Flight IIA upgrade. (…) 
The previous ship system changes were successfully executed 
by ECPs [Engineering Change Proposals] introduced via the existing 
systems engineering processes on both Flight II and IIA in support of 
the ongoing construction program. This methodology takes advantage 
of Navy and prime contractor experience with the proven processes 
while offering effective and efficient introduction of the desired 
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configuration changes. It also provides the more affordable and 
effective approach toward producing this enhanced ship capability in 
lieu of starting a new ship design to incorporate the same capabilities 
into a new production line for ship construction. (ASN[RDA], 2015) 
Another relevant example is the development of the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet 
into the EA-18G Growler. It would have cost far more to develop a new aircraft solely 
to meet the electronic attack mission. It is interesting that the Royal Australian Air 
Force has ordered that 12 of its acquisition of 24 Super Hornets be wired for 
potential conversion to Growlers, should the need arise (Fulghum, 2011). The 
success of the Super Hornet has been aptly described as follows: 
Although the E/F version continues the basic name and design 
concept of the original F/A-18, it was significantly redesigned. While 
originally maintaining 90% avionics and software commonality with the 
F/A-18C/D model, its airframe is 25% larger, and features radar, 
avionics, and weapons upgrades and more powerful engines. Its 
weapons and fuel stores capacity have been significantly increased, 
and it can be utilized as an aerial refueling tanker. The newer models 
also provide frontal stealth qualities. The enhanced capabilities of the 
F/A-18E/F are a possible explanation for the Navy’s decision not to 
seek to develop a direct replacement for the F-14 Tomcat. The multiple 
mission suites of the Hornet and Super Hornet may have allowed the 
retirement of a sizeable number of specialized Navy aircraft which had 
been fulfilling its combat aircraft roles with an associated reduction in 
logistics complexity. (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2011) 
A final note on the F/A-18 E/F is from the perspective of industrial policy. Only 
Lockheed Martin and Boeing remain as U.S. manufacturers of fighter aircraft. If 
production of the Super Hornet ends without a replacement aircraft, then Lockheed 
Martin will have a monopoly. There are some practical reasons to keep the Super 
Hornet in production, such as the fact that it can act as a tactical refueling aircraft for 
other F/A-18s, a capability the F-35 does not have. The Navy has a replacement 
program for the Super Hornets known as the F/A-XX, but that acquisition is far off. 
The future of Boeing’s vast St. Louis plant, which currently produces the F-15 in 
small quantities for export customers as well as the F/A-18 E/F, depends in great 
part on whether the DOD wishes there to be one or two providers of combat aircraft. 
As we discuss shortly, industrial base considerations play a more pronounced role in 
shipbuilding policy than is the case for aircraft manufacturing. 
Our brief discussion of a number of weapon systems has emphasized the 
benefits of continuing production of existing platforms that are flexible enough to 
meet the challenges of changing requirements and evolving technologies. We now 
turn to a review of the features of the DDG 51 vessels. 
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DDG 51 Class: Background 
The DDG 51 (Arleigh Burke) class of multi-mission destroyer is unique 
because of the size of the class, with 72 ships having been procured from FY1985 
through FY2015. The DDG 51 class shares the Aegis defense system with the 
Ticonderoga (CG 47) class of cruiser, and both types of vessels are often referred to 
generically as “Aegis ships.” The original main role of the Arleigh Burke class was air 
defense and mid-ocean operations, but the destroyers are now being outfitted for 
ballistic missile defense operations (O’Rourke, 2015c; McCullough, 2013).  
The first 28 DDG 51s (DDG 51–DDG 78) are referred to as Flights I/II. DDG 
79–123 are part of Flight IIA, which notably includes a hangar for two embarked 
Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System MK-III SH-60R helicopters omitted in Flight I/II 
ships (O’Rourke, 2015a; Program Executive Officer Ships, 2015). Current plans are 
to build at least 22 Flight III vessels (Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 
2015). Additionally, in-service vessels of the DDG 51 class are undergoing a DDG 
Modernization Program that will provide mid-life upgrades (Program Executive 
Officer Ships, 2015). 
No DDG 51s were procured during FY2006–FY2009 (O’Rourke, 2015c). 
Credit for the restart of production of the Arleigh Burke class in 2011 must be 
attributed in part to the significant development problems encountered with the 
Zumwalt-class (DDG 1000) destroyer. Only three of these vessels are under 
construction, with further production of DDG 51s in effect replacing the troubled 
Zumwalts. The DDG 1000s were designed with a number of revolutionary features, 
including a stealthy tumbledown hull and electric-drive propulsion. Of the 10 
transformational technologies incorporated in the DDG 1000, four were found to be 
immature at Milestone B. The decision to terminate the DDG 1000 program and 
restart the DDG 51 has been described as follows: 
The FY 2011 budget decision to truncate the DDG-1000 program at 
three ships and restart DDG-51 production was largely due to a 
change in the perceived threat and mission priority by Navy senior 
leadership. Priority was placed on ballistic missile defense rather than 
the original DDG-1000 precision and volume fire support mission. 
The radar hull study recommended the DDG-51 hull form with a 
new advanced missile defense radar (AMDR) as more effective in the 
ballistic missile defense mission than DDG-1000. DDG-51 with AMDR 
was also assessed to have less cost risk. (Blickstein et al., 2011) 
The Navy has also cancelled its CG(X) cruiser development program, with the 
DDG 51 intended as a bridge in capability, particularly in air and ballistic missile 
defense, to the eventual acquisition of new cruisers (Bliss, 2010; GAO, 2012; 
Hagerty, Stevens, & Wolfe, 2008). It could be suggested that the difficulties 
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encountered by the DDG 1000 and CG(X) have proven to be advantageous for 
continued production of the DDG 51.  
Traditional Navy policy has been to keep surface combatants such as 
destroyers and cruisers in service for 25 years. However, current projections show 
that the Navy intends to maintain the DDG 51 Flights IIA and III in service for 40 
years. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) viewed this plan with skepticism, 
pointing out that it might not be cost-effective or technically feasible to maintain and 
refit these complex vessels for such a long period of time (Analysis of the Navy’s, 
2013; CBO, 2013). 
In a unique arrangement, construction of the class is split between General 
Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works (Bath, ME) and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Ingalls 
Shipbuilding (Pascagoula, MS). The Navy allocates hulls equally to both yards, and 
the yard that submits a bid lower than what had been assigned by the Navy receives 
a higher profit margin. This approach, termed Profit Related to Offers bidding (a 
variant of Fixed Price Incentive [Firm Target]), has been described as competition for 
profit rather than for quantity and is considered a successful means of dealing with 
the challenge of maintaining competition in the face of small procurement quantities 
(Case Studies, 2014; GAO, 2012; Kendall, 2015; OUSD[AT&L], 2014, September 
19), and has won a David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award (Freedberg, 
2012). As emphasized by the GAO (2009),  
Moving to fixed-price contracting is an important element in changing 
the paradigm for shipbuilding programs—fixed-price contracting can 
only be used if risk is appropriately retired by the time a contract for 
construction is agreed on and a clear understanding of the effort 
needed to deliver the ship exists. 
Further stability is offered by the DOD’s funding strategy, which proposes 
buying two DDG 51s annually for FY2015 through FY2019 (Pentagon Budget, 
2014). This approach should assist both builders in recruitment and retention of 
skilled workers (GAO, 2009; Arena, Blickstein, Younossi, & Grammich, 2006, pp. 
61–62). It has been pointed out that industrial base considerations play an explicit 
role when developing a ship program’s acquisition strategy (Drezner, Arena, 
McKernan, Murphy, & Riposo, 2011, p. 39). 
Flight III Development 
The development of the most recent version of the ship, known as Flight III, 
has been a challenge for the Navy, yet confirms the presence of the “growth margin” 
discussed previously. The Navy plans to begin procurement of 33 Flight III ships in 
FY2016, with the first vessel, DDG 124, expected to achieve initial operating 
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capability in 2023 (Scott, 2015). Similarly, it has been observed that modifying the 
DDG-51  
over time has used up some of the design’s growth margin. The Flight 
III DDG-51 would in some respects have less of a growth margin than 
what the Navy would aim to include in a new destroyer design of about 
the same size. (O’Rourke, 2014) 
The current development challenges have been described as follows: 
DDG 51 Flight III ships are expected to feature new electric plants, 
new air-conditioning plants, and the AMDR. According to the Navy, the 
new electric plants are based on a design used on DDG 1000 and 
modification will be required for integration with DDG 51. The DDG 
1000 electrical system has faced delays in completing testing. Detail 
design work for Flight III will begin at the end of fiscal year 2014, 
according to the Navy. Adding AMDR to DDG 51 will result in a 
significant redesign of the ship and the Navy expects that Flight III will 
result in changes to more than 25 percent of Flight IIA drawings, 
although the Navy believes many of these will be minor alterations. 
The Navy will need AMDR’s design assumptions, such as its size, 
shape, weight, and power and cooling requirements in order to 
accurately redesign the ship. However, the Navy only recently awarded 
a contract for AMDR system development and the AMDR program is at 
least 6 months behind schedule. Based on its current schedule, the 
Navy plans to begin detail design work for Flight III at the end of fiscal 
year 2014—before AMDR has demonstrated full maturity-adding risk 
and uncertainty to the DDG 51 program. (GAO, 2014a). 
It should be noted, however, that the AMDR successfully completed its 
Critical Design Review in April 2015, including “a thorough review of all design 
information to ensure the system will meet required specifications within cost and 
schedule constraints” (Department of the Navy [DON], 2015) Among the benefits of 
the AMDR, other than its contribution to missile defense, will be a significant 
reduction in maintenance, allowing crews to spend more time actually operating the 
radar (Taylor, 2014). The AMDR is the largest new system on the ship, which 
otherwise uses existing systems from Flight IIA and some adopted in other classes 
of vessel: 
According to Capt [Mark] Vandroff [DDG 51 Shipbuilding Program 
Manager], development risk has been kept in check by the widespread 
re-use of existing machinery and systems. “When I needed electrical 
power, my friends in PMS 320 [NAVSEA’s Electric Ship Office], they 
said ‘Yes, we’ve got a generator for you. We’ll get you a power 
conversion module. They’re already out there, you don’t have to invent 
something new.’” 
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“That reduces our R&D [research and development] cost. You 
take a look at my budget, you will see that we are really tightening our 
purse strings for so much procurement. That’s always been our 
philosophy on Flight III. We’ve got one new thing we are inventing 
[AMDR]; everything else is what’s out there.” 
“So I take the DDG 1000 generators, I take the LHD 6/7 
electrical distribution system, I marry them up and I give the ship more 
power. I need to convert that power to 1000 V DC, do I take a power 
conversion module now under contract with DRS. We’re going with 
something we understand.” (Scott, 2015) 
As just stated, Flight III will use the generator (and power conversion module) 
from the DDG 1000, and the 4160 VAC Electric Plant from the LHD 6/7 class (ASN 
[RDA], 2015). Sharing the risk of systems from other programs and reusing existing 
systems were described as being among the characteristics of an open system 
approach. The reuse of systems from other classes of vessels is also an effective 
means of dealing with the “vendor lock” and IP challenges discussed previously 
(Wydler, 2014). In constant FY2013/2014 dollars, the cost of each Flight III vessel 
has been estimated by the DDG 51 program manager at $1.7 billion for a total fleet 
of 22 destroyers with two ships procured annually. In comparison, Flight IIA vessels 
cost an average of $1.5 billion each (Jean, 2014). 
The potential lack of sufficient growth margin in the DDG 51 Flight III, 
combined with the small number of DDG 1000s to be built, may raise questions as to 
the long-term capabilities of the combatant fleet. For example, electric drive, a 
feature of the DDG 1000s but absent from the DDG 51 class, is intended in part to 
provide sufficient power for future weapons such as lasers and the AMDR. One 
suggestion has been to lengthen the hull of the ships to permit future insertion of 
technologies such as electric drive and more advanced versions of the AMDR 
(Fabey, 2012; O’Rourke, 2015a; GAO, 2012; DON, 2014). It should be noted that 
the DDG 51 does not represent a full replacement of the projected capabilities of the 
three-ship DDG 1000 class and the cancelled CG(X): 
The Navy’s pre-2008 plan to procure DDG-1000 destroyers and then 
CG(X) cruisers based on the DDG-1000 hull design represented the 
Navy’s roadmap at the time for restoring growth margins, and for 
introducing into the cruiser-destroyer force significant numbers of ships 
with integrated electric drive systems and technologies for substantially 
reducing ship crew sizes. The ending of the DDG-1000 and CG(X) 
programs in favor of continued procurement of DDG-51s leaves the 
Navy without an announced roadmap to do these things, because the 
Flight III DDG-51 will not feature a fully restored growth margin, will not 
be equipped with an integrated electric drive system or other 
technologies that could provide ample electrical power for supporting 
future electrically powered weapons, and will not incorporate features 
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for substantially reducing ship crew size or for otherwise reducing ship 
O&S [operations & support] costs substantially below that of Flight IIA 
DDG-51s. (O’Rourke, 2015a) 
However, the Navy still plans to include electric drive in at least some of the 
Flight III ships, although space constraints are currently a concern. There are also 
plans to retrofit 36 Flight IIA destroyers with hybrid electric drive (Mazumdar, 2012), 
with a trial on one vessel described as follows: 
The fuel savings offered by a hybrid electric drive have prompted 
consideration of back-fitting a CODLOG [combined diesel electric or 
gas] option to the USN’s most numerous class, the Arleigh Burke 
destroyers. Changing the propulsion configuration of a warship post-
build potentially raises a large number of engineering challenges 
which, if costly, would negate the savings to be derived from reduced 
fuel usage. A pilot installation of a 1.9 MW electric motor attached to 
an existing lay shaft of the DDG 51 gearbox was trialled in USS 
Truxtun in 2012 [Flight IIA], and is scheduled for a much wider roll-out 
from 2017. Electrical power is drawn from the main electrical 
distribution system, which in the DDG 51 is provided by up to three 2.5 
MW gas turbine-powered generators. The configuration only provides 
electric drive to the port shaft, a compromise driven by cost versus 
benefit. (Scott, 2015) 
The GAO has also pointed out that adding a hybrid electric drive to the ship in 
Flight III “would require additional design changes to accommodate the new motors 
and supporting equipment” (GAO, 2012). Electric drive will be particularly important 
should the Navy proceed with plans to install laser weapons on the Flight III vessels 
(O’Rourke, 2015b).  
A GAO review of plans for the DDG 51 noted that the Navy’s Radar/Hull 
Study of 2009, which recommended the integration of the AMDR onboard Flight III 
vessels, “does not provide an adequate evaluation of combat system and ship 
characteristics, and does not include key elements that are expected in an AOA 
[analysis of alternatives] that would help support a sound, long term acquisition 
program decision” (GAO, 2012) These elements include computer processing ability, 
cyber warfare capability, reliability, information assurance capability, usability, 
proprietary versus open architecture combat systems, and scalability (GAO, 2012) .  
A related concern is that the Navy is considering a scaled-down (12-foot) 
version of the AMDR for Flight III; however, this smaller radar may not be able to 
meet the Navy’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) requirements. This 
challenge brings into question the entire strategy of using the DDG 51 as a means to 
bring ballistic missile defense to Aegis vessels (Fabey, 2011). The Navy is, however, 
considering an as-yet unproven concept of networking IAMD capabilities, which may 
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reduce the requirements for the AMDR carried onboard each vessel. The dilemma 
was summarized as follows: 
Analysts and contractors say it’s starting to appear that the Flight IIIs 
will be heavily modified to accommodate the AMDR. But the Navy’s top 
shipbuilder executive warns against that course. “Sometimes we get 
caught up in the glamour of the high technology,” [Huntington Ingalls 
Industries CEO Mike] Petters says. “The radars get bounced around. 
They get changed. Their missions get changed… The challenge is if 
you let the radars drive the ships, you might not get any ships built.” 
(Fabey, 2011) 
It should be noted, as mentioned in the next section, that the AMDR will now 
be 14 feet in width, so concerns about a scaled-down radar were premature 
(ASN[RDA], 2015). 
Integration Challenges 
The ship is already packed with equipment, with the DDG 51 being described 
as the “surface combatant class” (GAO, 2012). In a moment of pique, the CBO 
referred to a potential DDG 51 Flight IV as the DDG(X), stating that the CBO 
“considers it unlikely that the Navy would or could use the DDG-51 design for the 
next-generation destroyer” (An analysis of the Navy’s fiscal year 2014 shipbuilding 
plan, 2013). However, the point is now moot, as Flight IV was cancelled in 2014 in 
order to fund replacement of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (LaGrone, 
2014). One observer described the Flight III challenge as follows: 
Once this ship is built—mostly by performing superhuman feats of 
engineering on an already crowded ship—there will be a limited margin 
(power, weight, cooling, displacement) for future upgrade. What the 
Navy buys is essentially what it will have for the life of the ship, with 
modest upgrades available through computer program refreshes and 
the like, but not the kind of upgrades available (theoretically) in a more 
modular design in which power, cooling, radars, and weapons, etc. are 
treated as commodities that can be swapped out when increased 
capability (payloads) is available. (McGrath, 2013) 
In a similar vein, the GAO has assessed that the Navy’s acquisition approach 
to Flight III is not commensurate with risks, both financial and technical. For 
example, multi-year procurement is being used despite the high level of uncertainty 
associated with a challenging ship redesign: 
Further, technical studies about Flight III and the equipment it will carry 
are still underway, and key decisions about the ship have not yet been 
made. DDG 123 [the last Flight IIA ship] is not due to start construction 
until fiscal year 2016. If the Navy proceeds with this plan it would 
ultimately be awarding a multiyear contract including this ship next 
fiscal year, even though design work has not yet started and without 
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sufficient knowledge about cost or any construction history on which to 
base its costs, while waiting until this work is done could result in a 
more realistic understanding of costs. Our prior work has shown that 
construction of lead ships is challenging, the risk of cost growth is high, 
and having sufficient construction knowledge is important before 
awarding shipbuilding contracts. (GAO, 2012)  
Despite the Navy’s optimism, there is reason for some concern regarding 
acquisition plans for up to 43 DDG 51 vessels. Flights I through IIA were highly 
successful during both acquisition and operation. However, attempts to retrofit the 
vessel with the AMDR, increased power and cooling requirements, and a high 
density of equipment are driving a significant increase in the risk of this “proven” 
Aegis destroyer. The AMDR requires five times more power and 10 times more 
cooling capacity than the SPY-1D(V) radar being replaced (LaGrone, 2012). A 
recent discussion, however, showed that the Navy is aware of the risk and is 
managing accordingly: 
Three mantras characterise the Flight III design and development 
effort: minimum change, minimum risk, and maximum re-use.  
“We know what we need to do,” said Capt [Mark] Vandroff [DDG 
51 Shipbuilding Program Manager]. “We need to get a SPY +15 dB 
radar onto a DDG 51 hull and deliver it to the fleet. Every other one of 
those requirements after that, some of them might be nice but we 
might say, ‘I’m not taking that stuff today. I’m going to do something 
else. I’m going to keep the risk low.’ So the only technology that’s 
getting on [Flight III] is something that’s already ripe and ready right 
now.” (Scott, 2015) 
With the DDG 1000 class reduced to a boutique fleet of three vessels and the 
cancellation of the CG(X) program, the burden of IAMD rests squarely on the 
DDG 51. A key finding of the Radar/Hull study was that the DDG 51 design 
represented better value for money than the DDG 1000 for delivering IAMD 
capability (Scott, 2015). The GAO (2012) has recommended a “robust operational 
test program” for Flight III, despite Navy reticence. While there remains no formal 
AOA for Flight III, the DOD position is that documents such as the Radar/Hull study, 
when assembled, constitute an equivalent body of knowledge (GAO, 2012). The 
GAO has commented on the maturity and testing of the AMDR as follows: 
All four of AMDR’s critical technologies—digital-beam-forming; 
transmit-receive modules; software; and digital receivers/exciters—are 
approaching full maturity, and program officials state that AMDR is on 
pace to meet DDG 51 Flight III’s schedule requirements. In 2015, the 
contractor is expected to complete an engineering development model 
consisting of a single full-sized 14 foot radar array—as opposed to the 
final four array configuration planned for installation on DDG 51 Flight 
III—and begin testing in the contractor’s indoor facilities. Following the 
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critical design review, scheduled for April 2015, the program plans to 
install the array in the Navy’s land-based radar test facility in Hawaii for 
further testing in a more representative environment. However, the 
Navy has no plans to test AMDR in a realistic (at-sea) environment 
prior to installation on the lead DDG 51 Flight III ship. Though the Navy 
is taking some risk reduction measures, there are only 15 months 
planned to install and test the AMDR prototype prior to making a 
production decision. Delays may cause compounding effects on testing 
of upgrades to the Aegis combat system since the Navy plans to use 
the AMDR engineering development model in combat system 
integration and testing. (GAO, 2015) 
Furthermore, concerns have been raised about the lack of a self-defense test 
ship in Flight III’s operational test and evaluation program, as well as the absence of 
the at-sea testing plan with the AMDR, the testing plan having been specifically 
mandated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in a March 6, 2014, memorandum 
(Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2015). The requirement for an at-sea 
testing plan is echoed by the GAO’s (2009) recommendations on shipbuilding 
practice, which state that “critical technologies be developed into representative 
prototypes and successfully demonstrated in a relevant environment.”  
In a similar vein, a Congressional Research Service report expressed 
skepticism that the Flight III design potentially precludes fitting the vessel with a 
high-power laser due to lack of sufficient electrical power or cooling capacity. Lasers 
were viewed as being essential to the Navy’s ability to counter anti-ship cruise 
missiles or ballistic missiles in the future (O’Rourke, 2015a). 
Additionally, the GAO has expressed concern that the Navy plans to use 
ECPs to the existing Flight IIA multiyear procurement contracts, rather than establish 
new contracts, to construct the first three Flight III ships (GAO, 2015). Focusing on 
the AMDR as the major new system aboard Flight III, Congress mandated that the 
Navy submit a report on the AMDR ECP before going ahead with the work. That 
report explained the Navy’s strategy for Flight III development: 
ECP development is a fundamental systems engineering approach; an 
approach currently implemented in the DDG 51 program that has been 
continuously updated and improved since the program’s inception in 
the early 1980s and has resulted in the successful delivery of 62 DDG 
51 Class destroyers. The last three ships of the FY13-17 MYP [Multi-
Year Procurement] are designated as Flight III beginning with one of 
the FY16 ships. The Flight III is a modified repeat of the existing 
baseline and will be centered on the addition of an IAMD capability in 
the form of the AMDR-S [S-band radar], associated enhanced combat 
systems elements and requisite supporting HM&E [Hull, Mechanical, 
and Electrical] changes. These changes will be incorporated via 
discrete ECPs with the same proven processes and rigor that 
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produced successful Flight II and IIA upgrades to the class. (ASN 
[RDA], 2015) 
The Navy’s approach to Flight III balances the incremental need for ballistic 
missile defense (which led to the AMDR) with the demanding systems integration 
challenges of a complex vessel. The overall approach is somewhat conservative in 
the sense of limiting changes to those required by the AMDR itself or the supporting 
systems. In doing so, the goal is to continue the incremental approach that has 
characterized the successful development of the DDG 51 class. 
Conclusion: A Persistent Platform? 
With more than 70 vessels delivered or on order, the large size of the DDG 51 
class of guided-missile destroyer leads to the reasonable finding that this ship has 
been successful. The technology insertion and myriad of changes made to the ship 
over its four flights (I, II, IIA, and III), while retaining the same hull and essentially the 
same turbine, are further confirmation of the endurance of the Arleigh Burke’s 
fundamental design. Had funding not been cut to fund the Ohio-class submarine 
replacement, there might have been a Flight IV as well. 
The successful incorporation of evolving technologies into the class, 
culminating in a successful critical design review of Flight III’s AMDR in April 2015, 
makes it reasonable to characterize the DDG 51 as a persistent platform. Another 
supporting factor is the incorporation of major systems from the DDG 1000 and LHD 
6/7 vessels into Flight III, reducing acquisition risk and lowering costs. The GAO’s 
harsh January 2012 criticism of the planned insertion of the AMDR was perhaps 
justified; the watchdog agency’s concerns were probably the key factors behind 
Congress mandating a report on the AMDR ECP, which was released in February 
2015. On balance, the DDG 51 does represent a good example of an open system 
as contemplated in DOD guidance: minimized duplication for technology 
development investments, as well as shared life-cycle costs among several major 
shipbuilding programs. 
Critics have pointed out that Flight III lacks an AOA and is proceeding on the 
basis of an ECP rather than a new requirements and contracting process. Yet the 
Navy’s strategy does allow for the benefits of multi-year procurement, and with 
production of ships split evenly between two yards using the Profit Related to Offers 
concept, there is stability accompanied by reasonable incentives in the industrial 
base—something observers of the shipbuilding industry have often expressed a 
desire for. 
The DDG 51 has become a persistent platform because it is adaptable and 
was built with sufficient growth margin to accommodate evolving operational needs 
such as ballistic missile defense. With the cancellation of the CG(X) and truncation 
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of the DDG 1000 class at three ships, the Navy will be relying on the DDG 51s for 
years to come to meet a wide variety of maritime requirements. 
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